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1 mation originating within the joint committee in accordance
2 with standards used generally by the executive branch of the
3 Federal Government for classifying restricted data or defense
4 information.

5 (g) The joint committee shall keep a complete record
6 of all committee actions, including a record of the votes on
7 any question on which a record vote is demanded. All
8 committee records, data, charts, and files shall be the prop-
9 erty of the joint committee and shall be kept in the offices of
10 the joint committee, or such other places as the joint com-
11 mittee may direct, under such security safeguards as the joint
12 committee shall determine to be in the interest of national
13 security.

14 (h) The joint committee may make such rules respect-
15 ing its organization and procedures as it deems advisable,
16 but no measure or recommendation shall be reported from
17 the joint committee unless a majority of the members thereof
18 assent.

19 SEC. 2. (a) The joint committee shall make continuing
20 studies of—

21 (1) the activities of each information and intelli-
22 gence agency of the United States,

23 (2) the problems relating to the foreign information
24 and intelligence programs, and

25 (3) the problems relating to the gathering of infor-

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1 information and intelligence affecting the national security,
2 and its coordination and utilization by the various depart-
3 ments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United
4 States.

5 (b) Each information and intelligence agency of the
6 United States shall give to the joint committee such in-
7 formation regarding its activities as the committee may
8 require.

9 (c) As used in this joint resolution, the term "in-
10 formation and intelligence agency of the United States"
11 means the United States Information Agency, the Central
12 Intelligence Agency, and any unit within any of the execu-
13 tive departments or agencies of the United States conduct-
14 ing foreign information or intelligence activities (including
15 any unit within the Departments of State, Defense, Army,
16 Navy, and Air Force, but not including the domestic opera-
17 tion of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).

18 SEC. 3. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the
19 Senate and House of Representatives relating primarily to
20 any information and intelligence agency of the United States
21 or its activities shall be referred to the joint committee. The
22 members of the joint committee who are Members of the
23 Senate shall, from time to time, report to the Senate, and
24 the members of the joint committee who are Members of the
25 House of Representatives shall, from time to time, report to

1. the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with
2 respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective
3 Houses which are—

4 (1) referred to the joint committee, or
5 (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint
6 committee.

7 (b) In carrying out its duties under this joint resolu-
8 tion, the joint committee, or any duly authorized subcom-
9 mittee thereof, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit
10 and act at such times and places, to require, by subpoena
11 or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the pro-
12 duction of such books, papers, and documents, to administer
13 such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such print-
14 ing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems
15 advisable. Subpenas may be issued over the signature of
16 the chairman of the joint committee, or by any member
17 designated by him, or by the joint committee, and may be
18 served by any person designated by such chairman or
19 member.

20 SEC. 4. The expenses of the joint committee shall be
21 paid from the contingent fund of the Senate from funds ap-
22 propriated for the joint committee upon vouchers approved
23 by the chairman. The cost of stenographic services in re-
24 porting such hearings as the joint committee may hold shall
25 be paid in accordance with the established rules of the Sen-

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1 ate. Members of the joint committee, and its employees and
2 consultants, while traveling on official business for the joint
3 committee, may receive either the per diem allowance au-
4 thorized to be paid to Members of Congress or its employees,
5 or their actual and necessary expenses if an itemized state-
6 ment of such expenses is attached to the voucher.

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our foreign information and intelligence programs.

In my remarks this afternoon, however, Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to dwell at great length on the precise terms of this particular resolution. I think it is a good resolution but I am perfectly ready to be persuaded that a better one might be devised. The question of the exact structure and composition of this committee seems to me significantly less important than the more general questions of principle involved. I rise today, not to make propaganda on behalf of a particular proposal of mine, but rather to raise a matter which I think is in need of the widest possible and most intelligent public discussion.

As most Members are aware, the proposal of a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence is not a new one. In one form or another it has been introduced into this House in each of the last 10 sessions; in 1955 it was the subject of a 2-day hearing by the Rules Committee. In the Senate the Committee on Rules and Administration reported on it favorably in 1956, and for 2 days it was debated on the floor of that body. Nor is it partisan in nature. Back in 1959 resolutions similar to mine were sponsored in the House by eight Democrats and four Republicans. Earlier this year the matter was brought to our attention by a member of the other party, the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. ROGERS). Moreover, when Mr. MANFIELD's resolution came to a vote in the Senate in 1956, the minority in favor included many Members on both sides of the aisle. On that occasion one of those who voted in favor was the then junior Senator from Massachusetts, now the President of the United States.

If the proposal for a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence has come up so often and been supported by so many Members, why has it never been adopted? Frankly I do not find that question easy to answer, particularly since some of the arguments against it seem to me so feeble. Take, to begin with, the argument about secrecy. It is an argument that has been advanced every time the proposal has been discussed. During the Senate debate in 1956 the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. RUSSELL, went so far as to say that, rather than have a committee set up and information made available to Members of Congress, "it would be better to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency and, by doing so, to save the money appropriated and the lives of American citizens." A former Vice President, Mr. Barkley, took the same view in the same debate.

Now no one denies that CIA and other intelligence agencies must conduct a very high proportion of their operations in secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their work; without it they could not function, and the security of our country would be jeopardized. No one denies that. But what is true of the intelligence community is also true in many other areas of government: in the fields of atomic energy, weapons development, and foreign policy, for example. But does this mean that Congress is to have no effective au-

thority in these areas? Of course it does not. Congress has always asserted its right to concern itself with even the most sensitive areas of Government. And, where matters of the highest secrecy have been involved, Members of both Houses have shown themselves perfectly capable of exercising the utmost restraint. This was never more clearly demonstrated than by the experience of the Manhattan project during World War II, when members of the two appropriations committees were kept fully apprised of the progress of the project without on any occasion breaking security. And I am sure all Members of the House will agree that the record of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in this connection has been impeccable.

As in the case of the Atomic Energy Committee, I take it for granted of course that much of the work of the new committee—perhaps almost all of it—would be conducted in private and that the results would be made public only after a close screening by the appropriate Government agencies. Nevertheless, I admit that particular concern might still be felt about CIA, since breaches of security involving CIA might endanger the lives of American operatives in other countries, and also the lives of agents of other nations working in cooperation with us. I think this is a legitimate concern, but I hope to show later in my speech that there are many important aspects of intelligence work which could usefully be studied without any need to inquire in detail into the activities of particular persons and units in the field.

So much for the moment for secrecy. I find myself in even less sympathy with another argument that has also been advanced frequently in discussions of this question—namely, that the intelligence community exists solely to serve the President and the National Security Council, and that therefore we in the Congress have no right to seek a jurisdictional position. This doctrine was stated in an extreme form in 1956 by Mr. HAYDEN in the Senate. He said at that time:

The Central Intelligence Agency is an arm of the President. Under the Constitution, I feel we have no right to attempt to regulate an agency which is designed solely to provide the President, who, under the Constitution, is responsible for our foreign relations, with information to enable him to make decisions.

I, for one, cannot accept that doctrine. As every Member knows, these two branches of our Government, the executive and the legislative, are not watertight compartments separated by steel bulkheads; the material between them is flexible and porous. There are any number of congressional committees which keep a watch over the executive agencies. In this House we have, to name only two, the Foreign Affairs Committee which inquires constantly into the policies and actions of the President and his agents, and the Government Operations Committee which closely scrutinizes the entire organization of the executive branch. The Senate has a subcommittee whose area of operations borders on the very area I am discussing: the Subcom-

mittee on National Security Staffing and Operations.

If we are going to refrain from looking into the affairs of executive agencies, even agencies which report directly to the President, then I fear we are going to have to disband a large number of our committees, or at least to curtail severely their activities. Of course we in the legislature cannot and should not intervene in areas beyond our competence. But in my view we have not only a right but a duty to maintain a general surveillance over agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, which are established by statute and sustained by funds voted by the Members of these two Houses.

These arguments—concerning secrecy and the exclusively executive nature of the intelligence community—are at least consistent. But strangely enough those who oppose resolutions similar to this have often attempted to contradict, and that for these reasons Congress should abstain entirely from overseeing the intelligence community, but that on the contrary congressional oversight is already more than adequate. Senator RUSSELL made this claim in the debate already quoted, and it was refuted by Mr. Allen Dulles, the former Director of Central Intelligence, in his recent article in Harper's magazine. What is in fact the extent of congressional surveillance at the moment?

In both the House and Senate the bodies responsible for overseeing the intelligence community are the Intelligence Committees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. Neither the House Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction in this area. It is their obvious interest in intelligence matters. This might not matter were it not for the fact that the surveillance exercised by the four existing subcommittees is certainly both cursory and sporadic. For example, last year during a debate in the Senate the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts, my friend, Mr. SALTONSTALL, was asked how much time he devoted to the CIA affairs. Mr. SALTONSTALL was perfectly frank. He said:

I say on the floor of the Senate that we spend several hours and go into many details of operations, of expenses, of administration, and so on.

I ask Members to note the phrase "several hours"—not weeks or even days, but hours. The members of one of the most important committees in the other House devote only hours to the affairs of one of the most important agencies of our Government. The reasons for this are surely clear. The members of the four subcommittees lack any staff specialized in these matters; they themselves can have little time or thought to devote them. But even if these subcommittees do have more time for intelligence, nevertheless the disadvantages of having responsibility for the intelligence community divided up among four different subcommittees would, I think, be obvious to everyone. I maintain that congressional surveillance of the intelligence community is not now adequate.

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and cannot be adequate as long as it continues to be organized as it is at present.

A moment ago I referred to the Central Intelligence Agency as one of the most important agencies of our Government. What is true of CIA is, of course, even truer of the intelligence community as a whole. Yet from time to time those who maintain that intelligence operations fall exclusively within the executive sphere—those, in other words, who are opposed to the establishment of a joint congressional committee—try to persuade us, despite all we have heard and seen during the past few years, that nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory body, that that it is not directly concerned with the making of national policy. Mr. Allen Dulles himself remarked several years ago:

CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we furnish intelligence to assist in the formulation of policy.

Senator Russell during a debate in the other body was even more blunt:

Some Senators who addressed themselves to the resolution on Monday last, seemed to hold the opinion that the CIA was a policy-making agency. That theme ran all through the remarks which were made in advocacy of the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is far from being a policymaking agency. It makes no policy.

The distinguished Senator went on to say that CIA was merely a coordinating and information-gathering body whose function was simply to present its findings to the actual policymaking body, the National Security Council.

Senator Russell said all this in 1956. In my view it was scarcely plausible even then. Now in 1963, after our experiences in Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to say that CIA is in no sense a policymaking body is to say something that is palpably untrue. The National Security Act, under which CIA operates, does not, of course, formally assign it policymaking functions. But CIA is a policymaking body, and we all know it. The reasons have been well put by Prof. Harry Howe Ransom, our leading lay student of intelligence affairs. In his study "Central Intelligence and National Security," published as early as 1958, he has this to say:

Certainly the CIA has no policymaking responsibility. Yet policy making is not a simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic process. A key element in this process is the information available to policymakers. The man, or group, controlling the information available to policymakers does in fact play a major if indirect role in policymaking.

A few pages later Professor Ransom adds:

It would be unrealistic to suggest that the bright young men of CIA, by training, talent, and personality, do not hold strong views on controversial issues of national security policy. If it is granted that knowledge is indeed power, it will be recognized that in reality the CIA, through an increasing efficiency—and consequently rising credit with responsible decision makers—has come to play a major role in creating national security policy.

Surely those statements can no longer be regarded as anything but the simple truth. In fact even Senator Russell appears to have come round. Last year, during the hearings on the confirmation of Mr. John McCone to be Director of Central Intelligence, Senator Russell remarked:

In this period through which we are passing, this office is perhaps second only to the Presidency in its importance.

A few moments later he repeated the point. I am inclined to agree with Senator Russell. And I submit to you that one does not describe a man as holding an office "second only to the Presidency in its importance" if the agency of which he is the head is not itself a policymaking agency of the very first order of importance.

Up to this point, Mr. Speaker, I have been mainly concerned to clear the ground, as it were—to state as clearly as I could my objections to the arguments most commonly used by opponents of the proposal I am supporting. Only by implication have I suggested positive reasons why I think a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence should be established. I want now to address myself to the central questions: why do I think such a joint committee is necessary? and, equally important, what work do I think it might usefully undertake?

But first I have to make one further point. The Central Intelligence Agency, and indeed the entire intelligence community, is highly—and necessarily—cooperative in its mode of operations. For this reason outsiders like myself have no alternative but to rely for their information on newspaper reports, on the occasional published hearings on House and Senate committees, on the work of scholars like Professor Ransom, and on a miscellaneous variety of other sources. In the very nature of things our comments and criticisms cannot be authoritative. We are working in the dark, or at least in the semidark. Nevertheless, I think we do know enough to have reasonable grounds for supposing that all is not well within the intelligence community. Even more important, I think we know enough to be certain that we need to know more—and by "we," of course, I mean not necessarily the general public nor even every Member of Congress, but those Members who would serve on the kind of committee I have in mind.

Why, then, do I think such a committee should be established?

I have two general reasons. The first concerns the extraordinary number of specific criticisms that have been leveled over the years against the Central Intelligence Agency and, by implication, against the intelligence community as a whole. Admittedly, as Mr. Allen Dulles recently pointed out:

You cannot tell of operations that go along well. Those that go badly generally speak for themselves.

And I would not want for a moment to deny that the Central Intelligence

Agency has had a number of spectacular successes—the U-2 overflights, for example, and the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran. On balance it is almost certainly true to say that the intelligence community has served the Nation well. But the fact does remain that on occasion the community has blundered seriously, and that for its blunder the citizens of the United States have paid a heavy price.

Let me refer to just a few instances. Back in 1950, as Mr. Dulles himself has tacitly admitted, the intelligence community failed to anticipate the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. We are still living with the consequences of that particular failure. A few years later an incident involving the CIA caused us serious embarrassment in the Middle East and may have contributed indirectly to the Suez affair. In July 1953 President Nasser of Egypt declared in a speech at Alexandria that he had been strongly advised by a U.S. Government official to ignore an important message that he was about to receive from the State Department. It was subsequently confirmed that the official in question had been the regional representative of CIA.

More recently, of course, we had the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Chief responsibility for that lamentable affair must rest with the President of the United States. However, there can be no question but that the Central Intelligence Agency was deeply involved in the whole affair, and that its actions and omissions had a decisive effect on the eventual outcome. Surely most Members of the House will agree that it would be in the national interest to know whether such incidents were merely particular aberrations or whether, in fact, they form a pattern that is likely to be repeated in the future.

My second general reason for wanting for the establishment of this committee I can state quite briefly. It is this. I abhor government by secret. I regard it as inimical to the effective functioning of our institutions. I regard it as alien to our American way of life. Above all, I regard it as a threat to our fundamental liberties. I fully realize, of course, it should be clear from what I have said already that a high degree of secrecy is essential to the workings of the intelligence community.

But I fear that with respect to the intelligence community we are often the victims of secrecy for secrecy's sake. Things are done to us and in our name which we know nothing of. I do not wish to see the legitimate secrets of the intelligence community revealed to the press and on the air. Of course I do not. But it does seem to me of enormous importance that a few select representatives of the people, chosen by the two Houses of Congress, should be continuously aware of what the intelligence community is doing and of the way in which it is going about doing it. The American people have at stake, not merely their liberties but their lives.

Despite all I have said so far, there would, of course, be little point in establishing this joint committee unless we had some fairly clear idea of what we thought it should do, of what subjects we thought it should study. I propose, therefore, to continue by discussing four questions, all of high importance, which I think might usefully be investigated: first, the relations between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department, especially overseas; second, the relations between intelligence-gathering on the one hand and so-called special operations on the other; third, the selection and training of intelligence personnel; and fourth, the whole question of intelligence evaluation. I propose to deal briefly with the first three of these questions and to say rather more about the fourth.

First, the relations between CIA and the State Department.

The problem here has been posed succinctly by Henry Howe Ransom in the book I have already cited. On page 210 he writes:

The operation by the U.S. Government of a farflung secret apparatus for intelligence gathering and political action could have widespread diplomatic ramifications. There may be a basic incompatibility between the maintenance of accredited diplomatic missions in some 70 foreign posts (as of 1958)—

The number would be considerably greater now—

and the existence of American secret agents in most of these same foreign areas. Great care must be exercised in keeping U.S. diplomacy separated from spying and backstage political maneuvering, at least on the surface, yet the diplomats probably should not be completely in the dark as to the activities of American secret agents.

The possibly disruptive effect of having, on the premises of American embassies abroad or in the field, agents who owe allegiance to someone other than the ambassador and to an organization other than the State Department and who may be engaging in activities running counter to expressed State Department policy, scarcely needs spelling out in detail.

Nor are these dangers merely speculative. It seems, for example, that toward the end of the Chinese civil war remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army moved into parts of northern Burma. These troops claimed to be eager to harass the Communists across the border, and CIA accordingly supplied them with large quantities of money and arms. But according to available reports the Chinese had long since tired of fighting. Instead of attacking the Communists, they proceeded to settle down, to occupy much of the best agricultural land in northern Burma, and to cultivate opium—all with the assistance of U.S. funds.

This would have been a melancholy episode in any case. But what made it worse was the fact that our Ambassador in Rangoon apparently had not the faintest idea of what CIA was doing. When the Burmese Government formally complained to the United States, the Ambassador issued a categorical denial; he said the United States had nothing

to do with the activities of the Nationalist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course believed he was telling the truth. But what he was saying was in fact not true, and naturally the Burmese were shocked by this apparent evidence of American duplicity. What was the upshot of this episode? The American Ambassador resigned, the U.S. Government was deeply embarrassed, and the Government of Burma threatened for a time to break off diplomatic relations.

Admittedly, this incident was particularly ludicrous. But it is not without parallel. Our policy in the early stages of the Laotian crisis appears to have been constantly bedeviled by a lack of effective coordination between the CIA and the State Department. Similarly with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and Mr. Karl Meyer, in their able account of that affair, describe how, on its own initiative, CIA established close working relations with exiled supporters of the former dictator Batista. They add:

This decision marked the inauguration of what, in effect, became its independent foreign policy toward Cuba, in cavalier disregard of the thinking in the White House and the State Department.

Note that all this occurred despite the efforts of an earlier Secretary of State, Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize relations between the State Department and CIA. Since then the Herter-Aiken Dulles agreement on the relations between Ambassadors and CIA personnel in the field has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McCone. And by now we have reason to hope that the responsible foreign policymakers—the President and the National Security Council—have reasserted their authority over the Central Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a considerable extent this is a problem of particular persons and particular situations. But it is also the case that, as long as both State Department and CIA personnel are working in the field, as long as both agencies are responsible for the collection of information, and—perhaps most important—as long as CIA continues to be responsible for special operations, the problem of integrating the Central Intelligence Agency into our general foreign policy apparatus will remain difficult and will remain worthy of close and continuous examination. The exercise of surveillance in this field I conceive to be one possible function of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence.

A moment ago I alluded to the conduct by the CIA of so-called special operations; that is, the fomenting of opposition against hostile governments, the arming of insurgents, the provocation of enemy action, and so on. The question of housing these special operations—or additional services or other functions or whatever you want to call them—under the same roof as the CIA's purely intelligence-gathering operations has, of course, long been a matter of controversy, and it is this question that I suggest might usefully be the second of the new joint committee's areas of study.

I do not suppose we need to be reminded of the importance of this ques-

tion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was the most spectacular and best publicized of CIA's special operations. There was the Iranian affair in 1953, and the following year the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears to have had a hand in the main rifts in Eastern Europe, in East Berlin and Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless carefully supervised and controlled by responsible political officers, could unwittingly involve the United States in a major international crisis, possibly in war. If this was not clear before the Bay of Pigs, it ought to be clear now.

The institutional danger here is readily apparent and has often been stated. As Professor Ransom puts it:

To mix the two functions—

That is, of information gathering and special operations—

involves the danger that foreign agents collecting facts and trying at the same time to bolster or cause the overthrow of a foreign government in America's apparent interest may develop a less than objective sense for distinguishing between fact and opinion.

Messrs. Szulc and Meyer made the same point apropos of Cuba:

The CIA men were not only shaping, in effect, foreign policy, but were exempt from any meaningful outside checks on their activities. Indeed, they were in the enviable position of both organizing a clandestine operation and preparing the intelligence data through which the validity of the venture could be judged.

The obvious solution to this problem would, of course, be to divorce CIA entirely of its special operations function. Unfortunately the people in the most favorable position to collect clandestine information are often also the people best placed to engage in subversive political activities. In addition, a total divorce between the two functions would lead, in Ransom's words, to "confusion, duplication, and even outright conflict."

For a time the Maxwell Taylor Committee, appointed by the President to inquire into the Bay of Pigs affair, appears to have toyed, at least, with an alternative idea—the idea of transferring the bulk of CIA's special operations to the Defense Department. But this solution would have had the equally obvious disadvantage of ensuring that the uniformed military—and hence the credit and prestige of the U.S. Government—would become involved as soon as any paramilitary operation became a matter of public knowledge.

In the event, it seems that routine covert operations have been left in the hands of CIA, with control to be transferred to the Pentagon only if a particular project becomes so big as to warrant open military participation. Mr. Herbert Baldwin in the New York Times summed up the matter thus:

The general rule of thumb for the future is that the CIA will not handle any primarily military operations, or even operations that they cannot be kept secret. However, each case will apparently be judged on its merits; there is no hard-and-fast formula that will put one operation under the CIA and another under the Pentagon.

All of us, I think, will agree that this is an area in which hard-and-fast formulas are not appropriate and in which, in the nature of things, organizational gimmicks cannot solve the major difficulties. As in the case of relations between CIA and the State Department, much depends on particular people and particular situations. But largely because the problem is of this sort, because it is a problem which can never finally be solved, I feel very strongly that continuing congressional surveillance is urgently required. If a joint committee had been in existence in the early stages of the first Cuban crisis, and if it had had cognizance of this matter, would the Bay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I think it is at least possible that it would not.

Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me naturally to the third of the questions I think a joint committee might investigate: the whole question of recruitment and personnel within the intelligence community. For it seems to me perfectly clear that one of the things that went wrong with the abortive Cuban invasion—not the only thing, but one of the things—was that much of the CIA personnel responsible for the operation consisted of the sort of people who could not distinguish between the reactionary and the democratic elements in the anti-Castro camp, between the opponents of Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban people and those who, as former supporters of Batista, were anathema to them.

Let me quote again from Szulc and Meyer. In their book, "The Cuban Invasion," they write:

Thus the CIA established contacts in Miami with pro-Batista organizations and with exile groups whose entire political philosophy was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro status quo in Cuba. . . . These factions were placing themselves not only against Castro but against history; whether or not the CIA operatives were aware that total regression is impossible, the contacts with the rightist factions ran counter to official U.S. policy, aimed at encouraging social reform in Latin America."

A few pages later they remark that the activities of the CIA agents reflected a desire to promote anti-Castro groups which they could manipulate. They continue:

It also reflected an attitude of hostility to left-of-center exile groups by second-rate field operatives. This in turn affected the top level of the agency and resulted in a lack of understanding at the top. It is not clear to what extent the CIA attitude was ideologically motivated or was simply a response based on the agent's view of what was practical or realistic.

This tendency on the part of the CIA to seek out and support the most anti-Communist groups in the field, regardless of whether or not such groups are politically viable, has of course been manifested on a number of other occasions—in Laos as well as in Cuba, and apparently in Algeria and the Congo as well. It is a persistent tendency, and one that on occasion has had a damaging effect on our policy. I suspect it has something to do with the kinds of people the Central Intelligence Agency gets to work for it.

Is it wise, for example, to rely to an extent CIA seems to do on the services of retired service officers? One would suppose that retired service officers, though almost always men of great ability, would have an instinctive tendency to take a rather narrow, strictly "operational" view of the problems confronting them. Similarly, is it wise to rely too heavily on the services of political exiles and refugees? It seems reasonable, for example, to suppose that an exile from Ruritania, especially someone who has passionate convictions about what course events in his homeland ought to take, may not be the best person to assess what course events in his homeland actually are taking, especially if what is actually happening is not to his taste.

Please do not misunderstand me. I do not mean to impugn the enormous amount of valuable work being done by retired service officers and by exiles and refugees in the CIA. Without their help, the organization simply could not function. Altogether the Central Intelligence Agency undoubtedly commands some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Government. And of course I do not mean for a moment to suggest that CIA should be staffed with "soft-liners" or people who have had no personal experience of the countries in question. That would be absurd.

But what I do think is that we have to be sure that what we are getting are actually the facts, and not what we would like to be the facts. This is not a matter of personal preference one way or the other. It is a matter of finding out what is actually taking place—and personal preferences enter only as they may color one's judgment. I suspect that the judgment of the CIA is sometimes colored by the preference of its employees. I suspect that CIA ought to take special care to recruit and employ men and women of widely differing backgrounds, temperaments, and opinions. I suspect that in these kinds of situations one gets at the truth only when a wide variety of inclinations is brought to bear. But remember that these are my feelings only. I have little data at my command. All I am saying is that I have a hunch that CIA recruitment policy has had an effect on CIA's performance. I may be wrong, but I submit that the only way we in Congress can find out is by ourselves conducting an inquiry into the subject.

The whole question of personnel and recruitment is, then, the third of the areas I would like to see a joint committee study. I would only add that of course no investigation need inquire into the names and histories of particular individuals involved; there need be no breaches of security or secrecy. The matter we are concerned with is one of general policy.

Finally, I want to turn to what is perhaps the most difficult of the four questions I referred to earlier: the question of how best to organize the evaluation of the enormous amount of material collected every day by the various agencies of the intelligence community. Obviously evaluation of some sort takes place at every echelon within the community, but I am particularly concerned

about and its subsidiary work.

Probably a few words are in order on how these agencies are organized. I think the following description is roughly accurate, though the Central Intelligence Agency refused to provide me with authoritative information so I have had to rely on data from published sources.

By the phrase "intelligence community" I mean the numerous agencies within the executive branch concerned with intelligence collection and evaluation: the CIA, the new Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, RAND, and so on. The community as a whole is responsible for producing the national estimates—described by Professor Hanson as "three vital building blocks of national security policy." With the exception of the ultrasecret not estimates which are produced by special machinery within the National Security Council, most estimates are prepared under the aegis of the so-called Board of National Estimates.

This Board consists of a small number of intelligence experts—soldiers, diplomats, and scholars—who, to quote Hanson again, "provide as a kind of general staff for the intelligence community." The Board can initiate the preparation of an estimate. Much is usually done so only on request from the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, or some other member of the National Security Council. In effect, the Board of National Estimates sets the terms of reference, breaks the problem up into feasible components, and assigns appropriate tasks to the various agencies. The resulting staff studies are collected by the small Office of National Estimates. The Board then drafts either a straight estimate—that is, one which attempts to assess a foreign nation's intentions or future policies with implicit assumptions as to future U.S. policy—or a general estimate—that is, one involving broad assumptions concerning possible changes in U.S. policy. After the draft estimates have been returned to the participating agencies for their comments and criticism, it is submitted, possibly with dissent, to a committee which used to be known as the Intelligence Advisory Committee but is now named the U.S. Intelligence Board.

If the Board of Estimates is the planning board for the intelligence community, the Intelligence Board is its board of directors. As Professor Hanson is the "final forum for the production of intelligence community." It resolves jurisdictional disputes within the community and is finally responsible for forwarding the national estimates to the National Security Council. Inevitably the attempt is made to produce correct estimates, and usually the attempt is successful; but on occasion dissenting opinions will be submitted. The Intelligence Board meets usually once a week. It consists of the leading intelligence officials of the community and is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Two aspects of this process in particular are worth noting. The first is the central role of the Central Intelligence Agency. A high proportion of the intelligence community's first selection is done by CIA. The Board of National

The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board is Director of CIA. And, of course, the Intelligence community's spokesman on the National Security Council itself is also the CIA Director. The second thing worth noting, however, is the duality of CIA's role. Under the National Security Act, the agency is not only one of the participants in the intelligence community, it is also the chief agency responsible for coordinating it. In other words, at many points in the process of evaluation, CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge. This ambiguity is implicit in the title of the Director who is formally not the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" but simply "Director of Central Intelligence."

Now the danger here is clear. It is that the Central Intelligence Agency will become—perhaps it has already become—not merely the chief intelligence agency but the dominant intelligence agency, and that it will develop persistent institutional tendencies, biases, and even policies. This type of problem is, of course, not peculiar to the American intelligence community but is characteristic of any complex administrative apparatus. That is the reason it has constantly to be guarded against.

Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and a World War II intelligence officer, put the point this way:

Almost any man or group of men confronted with the duty of getting something planned or getting something done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider a single most desirable course of action. Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under duress, it is a snap judgment of the top of the head. I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst.

Sauls and Meyer, writing of the Bay of Pigs, conclude:

Yet CIA was not behaving idiotically; it was in many senses responding to the insulated rationalism that infects a sheltered bureaucracy. Indeed, if there is an institutional villain, it is bureaucracy itself—that hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can only look where it has been and not whither it is tending.

Professor Ransom calls it simply the problem of "feedback."

Naturally in the early months of 1961 the administration addressed itself to this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it could scarcely do otherwise. In particular it reactivated a watchdog group set up by President Eisenhower in 1956, originally called the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities and now named the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board, under the chairmanship of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, studied the question of evaluation and apparently forwarded one or more reports to the President in the course of the year.

These reports have not been made public, but I think it is possible to piece together from newspaper reports roughly what happened. It seems that the Kill-

members, were among those who played the role being played by CIA. They proposed that in future the Director of CIA should be more of a technician, and that a new post should be created, probably attached to the White House, with some such title as "Coordinator of Intelligence," the new coordinator would be in a position to analyze and assess the results achieved by the intelligence community without having any bias in favor of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared frequently in the press in June and July 1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of the New York Times stated that the new post had actually been offered to Mr. Fowler Hamilton.

Either these reports were inaccurate, or the administration changed its mind, or they could not find anyone to occupy the new post, because in September 1961 the President announced that Mr. John A. McCone had been named Director of Central Intelligence without any major change being made in the structure of the intelligence community. Subsequently, however, in January 1962 one such change was announced. Henceforth the Director of Central Intelligence was not to function both as Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board and also as CIA member of the Board. Instead, although the Director was to remain Chairman of the Board, his deputy was to act as representative of the CIA. In a letter to Mr. McCone, the President noted this change with approval. He added:

As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have overall responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as you may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence.

Clearly there was a dilemma here. On the one hand, it was evident that CIA's intelligence gathering and operational functions could conflict with its coordinating function—and, of course, what was true of the Agency was also true of its Director. On the other hand, the President and his advisers were almost certainly aware that an independent coordinator, who was not himself the head of a major agency, might find himself weak, even powerless, in the face of the vast intelligence bureaucracies. Independence in theory might mean impotence in practice. So a compromise was struck, and the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence merely redefined.

How successful this compromise has been it is probably too early to say. But from all that I have said, it ought to be obvious that the problem of evaluation, like the other problems I have already mentioned, is a continuing one, and not one that can be spirited out of existence by merely institutional gimmickry. It is also obvious that the problem of evaluation is an enormously important problem, probably the most important confronting the intelligence community. For these reasons, I think that it, too, should be a continuing subject of scrutiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed committee of Congress.

considerable length, yet I am only too well aware that I have only skinned the surface of this extraordinarily complicated and difficult subject. There are any number of further questions that I might have posed—for example, concerning the apparently increasing concentration of authority within the intelligence community, or about the role of the U.S. Information Agency. And, of course, I must repeat that this has been essentially an outsider's analysis. I have been trying merely to suggest what kinds of inquiry a joint committee might undertake, not to anticipate what the results of those inquiries would be.

Nor as I remarked at the outset, do I wish to insist that the resolution I am introducing today provides the only possible way of proceeding. Perhaps the joint committee should be given rather different terms of reference. Or perhaps a body should be established comprising private citizens as well as Members of Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic about this. My purpose in speaking today has been to reopen public discussion of an issue that has too long been dormant, and moreover to reopen it at a time of relative tranquility, when the intelligence community is not in the public spotlight, at a time therefore when these matters can be considered soberly and dispassionately.

But we in Congress should not be too timid about putting ourselves forward. I wonder how many Members of this House are aware of the enormous body of opinion in favor of the creation of a congressional joint committee. Both the Hoover Commission and its special intelligence task force favored congressional intervention. The New York Times has consistently supported the idea in its editorial columns. Two years ago the distinguished military analyst, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and operations under constant top-to-bottom surveillance and review." He noted that the machinery for achieving this would be greatly strengthened by the creation of a joint congressional watchdog committee.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to quote just once more from the writings of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who, as I have already said, is our country's leading lay student of intelligence affairs. I think his comment deserves all the greater consideration because it comes from a member of the political science profession—a profession which, as we all know, has always had a strong bias in favor of the executive branch of government. On page 266 of "Central Intelligence and National Security" Professor Ransom remarks:

It is common experience for security policymakers, military and civilian, to find their fear of congressional interference changed into gratitude for congressional support, frequently more enthusiastic than has been accorded on the part of the Executive of Government. No executive agency today reveals everything to congressional committees with jurisdiction over its operations. Officials of central intelligence may be ex-

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Mr. Lindsay proposes four questions of high importance which "might usefully be investigated."

1. Relations between CIA and the State Department, especially overseas;
2. the housing of so-called special operations under the same roof as the CIA's purely intelligence gathering activities;
3. selection, recruitment, and training of intelligence personnel;
4. the whole question of intelligence evaluation.

There follows a listing of Lindsay's arguments or charges, with comments, which he asserts support the establishment of a Joint Committee to investigate the four questions listed above.

<u>Arguments or Charges</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1. Lindsay states the argument of secrecy has been used against earlier proposals for a Joint Committee but concedes CIA must conduct its operations in secret. On the other hand, he states secrecy is also necessary in the field of atomic energy, weapons	1. Clearly Lindsay recognizes the necessity for secrecy and in fact is only debating the method by which the Congress is informed of intelligence activities. Other than his charge of secrecy for secrecy's sake, we see no disagreement between Lindsay and CIA as to the

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development, and foreign policy
"and adds that secrecy itself is not
a bar to the Congress having
effective authority. "With respect
to the intelligence community we
are often the victims of secrecy for
secrecy's sake." He asserts that
a "few selected representatives of
the people chosen by the two Houses
of Congress should be continuously
aware of what the intelligence
community is doing and of the way
in which it is going about doing it."

need for proper security.

2. Lindsey advances another argu-
ment which he states has been used
in discussions of the Joint Com-
mittee, namely "that the intel-
ligence community exists solely to
serve the President and the
National Security Council, and that,
therefore we in the Congress have
no right to seek a jurisdictional
position." In rejecting that

2. As a practical matter, the
real question here is the degree to
which a Joint Committee would in
fact delve into operational matters
which impinge on the foreign policy
responsibilities of the President.
On the other hand, with the existing
Subcommittee setup, the same
practical question could arise.

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doctrine, Lindsay cites two committees which look into executive branch matters--the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Government Operations Committee.

✓ 3.a. Lindsay states "I maintain that congressional surveillance of the intelligence community is not now adequate." He comments that members of the existing four Subcommittees devote only hours to Agency affairs and, secondly, they lack any staffs specialized in these matters.

3.a. Here then is the real thrust of Lindsay's position, that is, the existing Subcommittees are not fulfilling their responsibilities. From our viewpoint, this is a matter for the Congress to change. Factually, the Agency met with the House Armed Services Subcommittee on five occasions lasting several hours, and another Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee met four full days on the early retirement bill. We met with House Appropriations Subcommittee five times. The Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees met in joint session three times.

3. b. Lindsay also states "the disadvantages of having responsibility for the intelligence community divided up among four different subcommittees would, I think, be obvious to everyone."

4. It is charged "But CIA is a policymaking body, and we all know it." "To say that CIA is in no sense a policymaking body is to say something that is palpably untrue."

3. b. With a Joint Committee, neither Senate nor House Appropriations would relinquish their authority for CIA appropriations so that at the very least there would still remain three committees. Further, in the case of State and of DOD with its components, the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Relations Committees would be highly unlikely to cede jurisdiction so that rather than lessening the number of committees the Joint Committee for this purpose would simply be superimposed. This, of course, raises most difficult jurisdictional questions in the Congress itself.

4. While quoting disclaimers, both by Dulles and Senator Russell, Lindsay points to Cuba and Laos and quotations from Ransom's book to support his bare assertion that CIA has a policymaking role. He bolsters his

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6. Lindsay discusses the problem of so-called special operations being housed in the Agency with its normal intelligence functions. He discusses the Taylor Committee and speculates that there was consideration of transferring special operations to DOD but recognizes the obvious disadvantage. He discusses the Hanson Baldwin article which summed up the results of the Taylor Committee, saying that CIA would not handle paramilitary operations of a size which could not be kept secret. Lindsay winds up agreeing that this is an "area in which hard-and-fast formulas are not appropriate." Lindsay asserts that "because it is a problem which can never finally be solved, I feel very strongly that continuing congressional surveillance is

6. This point again raises the question of how far a Joint Committee or any congressional committee can properly go into sensitive foreign policy actions directed from the highest level in the executive branch. Lindsay fully recognizes the difficulty of the specific problem but does not indicate how a Joint Committee would assist in a solution other than asserting a Joint Committee should look into it.

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whether it is wise to rely on the services of political exiles and refugees. Lindsay concedes the valuable work being done by such individuals and adds that the Agency "undoubtedly commands some of the ablest minds in the U. S. Government." He also states "I do not mean for a moment to suggest that CIA should be staffed with 'soft liners' or people who have had no personal experience of the countries in question."

6. Lindsay concedes that the question of evaluation of information is a most difficult problem. He then discusses the estimative process with less than complete accuracy. He notes two points: (1) the central role of the CIA and (2) the duality of CIA's role, i. e.,

and parcel of the Agency's required way of doing its business, and to say we "rely" on them is extreme.

8. Again it seems doubtful that a Joint Committee could contribute in a positive fashion to improving the estimative process. If CIA is not to be "central," what agency is to be? Congress in its wisdom wanted a central point and by statute placed this responsibility on the Agency. A full

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it is not only a participant in the intelligence community but it is also the Agency responsible for coordinating it. "CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge." Lindsay mentions the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He also discusses the appointment of the DDCI as the CIA member of USIB with the DCI retaining his role as Chairman of USIB. Lindsay concedes the dilemma and feels this last step was a compromise. He concludes on this point by stating the evaluation problem is "probably the most important confronting the intelligence community."

and factual discussion with Lindsay of the complicated estimating process could educate Lindsay, but it is doubted that it would change his view that a Joint Committee should continuously study and review the job.

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you may have many things handed to you that will not be to your liking. And, because I believe that a great, a healthy and a prosperous mining industry in this country is one of the real cornerstones of the American economy, I have tried to issue a challenge to the American mining industry.

Now I do not at this time or at any other time want to tell you that I have all the solutions to your problems because I know that I do not. But I hope that my approach may cause you—the brains of a great industry—to think about your present job and about your future.

Before I introduced the bill to revise the mining laws I sent it to a number of my friends in the mining industry and it came back with this remarkable analysis. Those men that I classify as middle age and over, all thought it was terrible and those that I classify as below middle age—I mean by that those younger than myself—all thought it was marvelous.

Now let me see what I have tried to do. This bill has two purposes. First, it would protect the interest of the legitimate prospectors and miners by establishing an orderly procedure for the exploration and discovery of mineral deposits and the patenting of mining claims on public lands. I might tell you folks that you are one of the few groups in this country that has the right to get a patent but believe it or not there are other groups in this country that are looking at this right that you have and saying that if the miners have it, why can't we. Just a few days ago, in Washington, when our committee was conducting hearings on Chairman ASPINALL's bill, H.R. 8070, to provide a commission for the overall review of the public land laws, a representative of the cattle industry, and a very able representative, stated that when cattlemen go on the public range and they place developments on the public range, why should they not be given the right to get a patent to that land just as the miner does when he discovers a mineral. Let me tell you, my friends, that you've got a hard answer to come up with because the cattle industry is also an important cornerstone in this great country of ours and they, too, use large sections of this public domain and they have improved our range and they have prevented rushing washoffs and rapid runoffs and they're spending their money to make sure that they can continue to have a healthy operation.

The second purpose of the mining revision bill that I introduced is to protect the overall public interest in public lands, on which mining activities are permitted, by assuring that mining is conducted in a manner compatible with other multiple-use objectives of the public lands.

Now the legitimate miner has been held up to public ridicule and scorn because of the weekend miner. A man who takes advantage of the loopholes in the law of 1872 to get himself a piece of the public domain under the guise of mining and who gets a personal and preferential use in outstanding recreation, scenic, hunting and fishing areas, is abusing the law and bringing criticism on all. One of the outstanding cases is one that occurred a few years ago in the State just north of here. You are all familiar with it. Patents were issued under the guise of mining. Let me tell you that the payroll, as shown by the reports that were filed, would not have paid for the 8 years' assessment work on the claims; but, in the meantime, on the lands which were patented, over 2 million board feet of valuable timber was cut. Oh, they got a little mineral, that's true; but they didn't get much. And I am satisfied that it was never the purpose to get minerals in the first place.

Now if your industry really believes that

you can stand on the law of 1872 then I as an easterner warn you today—and as a friend I warn you—that you are in trouble. I hope that from this convention you, who are the brains of the industry, will come forward not only to your Congress, but to your Secretary of Interior and to your Secretary of Agriculture, with a constructive revision program so that in the years to come we may continue to have a healthy American mining industry.

QUESTIONS ON PROPOSED UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION ON MAN-ON-THE-MOON PROJECT

(Mr. JOHANSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Speaker, apropos of the President's recent proposal that the United States and Soviet Russia collaborate on the man-on-the-moon project, I respectfully raise these two questions:

First. If this moon-shot project is not expected to contribute substantially to our military know-how and national defense, how can we justify to the American taxpayers the many billion dollars of cost which it involves?

Second. If it is definitely anticipated that this project will develop vital military information and thus contribute to national defense, how can we justify making Soviet Russia a partner in the project, and, therefore, a cobeneficiary of that vital military information?

I would like to hear an uncensored and unpurgated answer to these two questions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PROPOSED JOINT COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE CIA

(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, the growing press reports to the effect that there has been a breakdown of relations, even of communication, between the State Department and the CIA in South Vietnam can no longer be ignored. It is bad enough that U.S. policy in this part of the world can, at best, be described as "misunderstood"—and therefore clumsy—but when clumsy policy is divided up between quarreling U.S. agencies it is even worse. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. ROGERS] has just referred to an additional press report of the divisions, disagreements, and breakdowns in communication between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency in South Vietnam. Now if these reports are right, we should not be sitting still. If they are wrong, they should be exposed as false and the record set straight. In any event it seems plain that there have been leaks from one agency or the other or both.

Eighteen Members of the House of Representatives, I among them, have introduced resolutions calling for the creation of a joint committee to supervise the intelligence

least two Members of the other body have introduced identical resolutions. A few weeks ago I spoke for an hour on the floor on this subject. I think we Members of the House would not be living up to our obligations as legislators were we to ignore this question.

Recently Hanson Baldwin, distinguished journalist and expert on military and security affairs—a person who individually believes in executive control in matters of this kind—has written a second major article on the U.S. intelligence community and has again pointed to the absence of congressional supervision over this giant, billion-dollar complex.

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAM

(Mr. PRICE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include a speech by the Director of the Rural Electrification Administration.)

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, so much is being said about the job of rural electrification being finished that there is a real danger Members of the Congress may be misled into accepting a false impression of this vital and constructive program.

It is refreshing then to have the views of the man who is in position to gage the status of rural electrification today, the very able Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration, Norman M. Clapp. These views are being expressed by Mr. Clapp in a series of meetings around the country with the men and women who direct and manage the rural electric cooperatives which have wrought a miracle in bringing the benefits of electricity to areas far from the central station plants which produce light and power for our cities and suburbs.

In this speech Administrator Clapp is proposing "A Program for Growth" which he believes is necessary if the rural power systems are to succeed in achieving the objectives of the Rural Electrification Act. Toward this goal, he proposes an orderly and businesslike approach to the unfinished business of rural electrification through a program which will permit the rural electric systems to become self-sustaining.

It should be understood that the proposals and the program he offers are the product of his experience and deep personal interest in REA, cooperative rural electrification, and the development of rural America. He has brought to this task the background of his long and close association with the rural electric cooperatives in his native Wisconsin, and the habit, which he developed while publishing a county seat newspaper, of weighing a situation fairly and objectively, in meeting his obligation to all the people. Thus he has shaped a policy which he believes will serve the interests of every American, while helping to assure the future security and effectiveness of the rural systems which serve those who created them, the 5 million member-owners of the REA-affiliated cooperatives.

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There is much legitimate concern about the possibility that we will be denying future generations the use of valuable minerals and valuable essential sources of water if we close off these areas for wilderness preservation. This provision that I have read to you is apparently intended to make people who are not familiar with the realities of the situation believe that the wilderness bill does not lock up these mineral resources about which everyone is concerned. You and I know that the provision doesn't mean a thing because nobody is going to risk the capital investment required for exploration today unless he has an assurance that he will be permitted to develop a mine if he makes a discovery. The Senate-passed wilderness bill denies this assurance.

Likewise, we will expose in the House of Representatives the fact that the proposed authority of the President to permit prospecting and mining is meaningless except in the context of anticipating the day when the United States has no mineral resources any place else. The mining industry and its friends know how long it takes to find and develop a mine. We recognize that it is ridiculous to say that these resources, although locked up, will be available in the event of an emergency—time just would not permit finding and developing mineral resources after we are enmeshed in an emergency situation.

My conclusion, therefore, is that if we are going to have wilderness legislation there must be realistic provisions relating to the discovery and development of our mineral resources. I assure you that if a bill is reported out of my subcommittee it will have simple, unmistakable language that even the lawyers will understand, prescribing the guidelines for any restriction on mining activity.

Last year, when the House Interior Committee reported a wilderness bill that represented an effort by the committee to effect a compromise between the proponents and opponents of wilderness legislation, 6,822,400 acres of forest land were classified by the Forest Service as "wilderness," "wild," and "canoe"; and the House committee version of the wilderness bill would have given these 6.8 million acres of land immediate wilderness status, subject to continued mineral exploration and development for a 25-year period. In the year that has passed since that bill was reported out, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service have added over a million and a half acres in these categories so that there are now 8,391,648 acres in wilderness, wild, and canoe areas.

Areas presently classified as, and given wilderness protection by the Department of Agriculture, restrict the type of use that can be made of the areas. Miners have demonstrated that they can prospect for and develop the mineral resources while preserving the wilderness characteristics. In answer to some of the arguments that maintain that the wilderness areas possess no mineral values, we have a report prepared by the Chief of the Forest Service indicating that, since the first wilderness bill was passed by the Senate September 6, 1961, 350 mining claims were filed in wilderness and wild areas and an additional 187 claims have been filed in primitive areas within the national forests.

These statistics point up a few things: (1) There are mineral resources in the areas embraced by the wilderness bill; (2) prospectors are willing to enter these undeveloped areas in search of valuable minerals; and (3) the 350 acres in wilderness and wild areas, at 20 acres per claim, would involve 7,000 acres out of over 8 million acres, or less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the area that would have been given wilderness protection by both the Senate bill and the House committee bill of last year. Incidentally, I do not know whether the

Chief of the Forest Service used but he estimated that, of the 350 claims, only 88 "may be valid," thereby reducing to 1,760 acres the area in which we may expect mining development to take place. I do not think that mining threatens the wilderness.

The bill reported out by the House committee last Congress tried to compromise the mining issue by providing the 25-year period I referred to earlier, during which mining would be permitted and after which the lands would be withdrawn from appropriation under the mining laws. Let us review some of the other important provisions of that bill.

The wilderness, wild, and canoe areas have been identified with precision; however, the primitive areas must still be delineated. Therefore, we can blanket in the wilderness, wild, and canoe areas because we know exactly what land is affected. But we cannot do the same with the primitive areas because even the wilderness advocates recognize that these areas must be reviewed. Only after they have been reviewed can we in Congress pass on whether specific areas should be given wilderness protection.

The committee sought to preserve the traditional position of Congress as making policy in the field of land management and leaving it up to the Executive to carry out those policy guidelines. If, on top of the protection given by the executive branch to these wilderness areas, we are going to provide legislative protection, it is necessary for Congress to pass on each individual area.

At this point, let me give you an example of what I consider to be a weakness in the Senate wilderness bill: Under section 3(b)(1) of S. 4, the Secretary of Agriculture would review the primitive areas and then the President would submit his "recommendations," which would become final unless vetoed by Congress, providing for any alteration in the boundaries of the primitive areas subject to the proviso that any primitive area recommended for inclusion in the wilderness system could not be larger in area than the amount classified as primitive on the effective date of the act. In some of the primitive areas there are thousands of acres of land devoted to uses, such as roads, that are incompatible with wilderness. The Senate bill would therefore permit the Department to drop out 10,000 or 50,000 or more acres of roads or other uses and substitute 50,000 acres of land that might be potentially valuable for resource development; or, to put the example in practical terms, the Executive could drop 50,000 acres of rocks, stones, and rattlesnakes and include in the wilderness 50,000 acres of mature timber. In order to make certain that Congress acts based on full knowledge of the facts, I assure you that, if there is going to be a wilderness bill, there will be provision for affirmative action by Congress after the Chief Executive or his Cabinet officers have made their review and submitted their recommendations to the Congress.

We have not scheduled any hearings on wilderness legislation because, right at the moment, there seems to be no point in doing so. Should it develop that the wilderness proponents are willing to move in the direction of the compromise offered by the House committee last year, I would be willing to schedule hearings on this legislation.

I recognize the fact that no direct specific testimony was received by our committee on the proposals offered by the House committee. Accordingly, if the House of Representatives recesses during November and legislation along the lines of the House committee compromise wilderness bill seems possible, I will seek authority to hold hearings in the West on proposals that might lead to such compromise along the lines of that bill. If the House does not take a recess, then it seems to me the best way to get the word out to have the staff work com-

pleted this fall and to hold hearings in Washington in the early part of next year, relying on national organizations such as yours to obtain the views of the people of the West on the specific proposals contained in the House committee bill.

I am pleased to have had this opportunity to discuss this legislation with you on the same platform with the chairman of our Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; I feel certain that he will continue to support me in my views that hearings on the wilderness legislation would serve no purpose unless we have some advance indication or assurance that the wilderness advocates will move in the direction of the House committee bill.

PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC LANDS SESSION, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1963, AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS MINING CONVENTION, LOS ANGELES, CALIF., BY THE HONORABLE JOHN P. SAYLOR, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the House, and colleagues on the panel, and friends, having been the individual in Congress who introduced in the House of Representatives the first wilderness bill and who introduced the bill to modernize the mining laws and after hearing the comments that have been made, I take consolidation in the fact that in the dark days of President Lincoln's administration when he looked everywhere for friends and could find few, he was delighted one day to have call upon him a group of people that he had known in Springfield, Ill. They asked him, "Mr. President, how do you like your job?" It is reported that he leaned back in his chair and stretched his long legs and looked at them and said "Well I'll tell you it reminds me very, very much of the man who had been tarred and feathered and was being ridden out of town on a rail," and he said "that if it wouldn't have been for the honor he would just as soon have walked."

Now many people have asked me why you from Pennsylvania take an interest in the West. Let me tell you that I come from an area in Pennsylvania—and I'm delighted to look out in this crowd and see a former Johnstown, Mr. Williams, who is here as one of the officials of the Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.—he can tell you that in the section of Pennsylvania from which we come—we are very much interested in mining. And I am delighted to have this opportunity to come here and talk to you, because, sometimes, it is from those who are not in your organization that you might find some of the things that are causing other people to look at you askance. One year ago at this meeting, Chairman ASPINALL said this to you "one of the difficulties of the public lands laws including the mining law is that they have been in existence for a long time without an overall review and overhaul. The scope of the mining law of 1872 has been curtailed by the Mineral Leasing Act. The procedure, however, for locatable minerals remains exactly the same despite the fact that just about everything else in the United States has changed." And I'd like, one year later, to say "Amen" to that statement—because it's true—even truer today than a year ago.

One of the reasons that I have introduced a bill to revise the mining laws is that there are groups and people in this country that look upon you as despolders. This I do not believe. But unless something is done by the American mining industry to help create a better atmosphere and a better impression among the American people, you are in trouble. If you are afraid of change—then you are in more trouble. If you want to hang on to what you have and say that a hundred years ago it was given to you and that you are afraid that some day in the near future